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If one were to name the single most entrenched commandment of the young scholar
approaching macroeconomic policy evaluation there is little question that the mantra ”Thou
shalt beware of the Lucas critique” would spring to mind. Indeed, since Lucas published his
rightly famous critique (Lucas, 1976), the usefulness of traditional ”structural” econometric
models as a means for macroeconomic policy selection has been seriously questioned. It
scarcely needs to be recalled what is the content of the Lucas critique: traditional econometric
models — i.e. models embodying decision rules with constant coef¿cients — fail to recognize
that, due to the need to anticipate the future course of policy variables, the coef¿cients of
(rational and forward looking) agents’ decision rules depend on the parameters that govern the
policy stochastic process, as well as on the primitive (or ”deep”) parameters that characterize
tastes and technology. As a result, traditional ”structural” models do not capture the actual
structural parameters and the estimated coef¿cients are subject to variability in the presence of
shifts in the policy rules.
While the stringent logic of the critique undoubtedly contributed to its success,
2 it can
be argued that had the critique been merely a negative one it would have been dismissed
as paralysing, and consequently neglected or downgraded, as Sims (1982) suggested, to the
rank of a cautionary footnote. Instead, much of the strength of the Lucas critique lies in
its constructive content, hinted at in Lucas’ original paper and more fully developed in later
works by Hansen and Sargent (1980, 1981) and Sargent (1981). Indeed, the critique does
not leave the practitioner at sea, as it comes with a ”recipe” for proper (econometric policy
evaluation) behaviour: (a) solve the agents’ optimization problems and derive the explicit
expressions of their decision rule coef¿cients as a function of deep and policy parameters￿
(b) estimate the coef¿cients of the decision rules together with the coef¿cients of the policy
process, disentangling the dependence on deep parameters from that on policy parameters￿
4 We thank Albert Ando, Carlo Favero, Carlo Giannini, Marco Lippi, Ignazio Visco and the participants to
seminars at University of Rome ”La Sapienza” and at CIDE for helpful comments. The usual disclaimers apply.
5 In truth, the sharp logic of the critique is not as compelling as it looks at ¿rst sight. On the one hand,
general rational expectation models are plagued by indeterminacy of the equilibria, so that Lucas-proof constant
parameter optimal decision rules can be found that do not violate the rationality of expectations (Farmer, 1991).
On the other hand, opposite to forward-looking, backward-looking behaviour might prevail in practice, as agents
might simply adopt a ”wait, see, react” strategy. Most importantly, whichever behaviour does in fact prevail can
be statistically tested, and the Lucas critique is generically refutable (Hendry, 1988￿ Favero and Hendry, 1992).10
(c) recompute the coef¿cients of the decision rules, taking into account the change in policy
parameters, while keeping the deep parameters unchanged. This prescription, as conceptually
simple as it is technically demanding, would guarantee that the simulated response to a policy
shock takes into account the purposeful responseof privateagents, thusimproving on thenaïve
prediction of the traditional approach.
Recognizing the importance of the constructive side of the Lucas critique, however, is
like being kind to be cruel. Lucas’ recipe can be applied by macroeconometricians only if a
representative agent (-￿ henceforth) is warranted, since a single aggregate time series would
not allow many idiosyncratic deep parameters to be recovered.
3 But the strength of the recipe
— which weshall label as the representativeagent FXP rational expectations (5$5() approach
— hinges on the possibility of ¿nding an adequate representative agent. Which is where the
troubles begin.
In a very remarkable paper Kirman (1992) gave an impressive list of the pitfalls
presented by the notion of -￿.
First, Debreu, Mantel and Sonneschein’s theorem can be taken as an ”impossibility
theorem”: in general equilibrium, the -￿ does not (in general) exist. This follows from the
simple fact that, as aggregate excess demand need only satisfy continuity, homogeneity and
Walras’ law, it will not in general satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences￿ therefore
there will be no utility function that generates the given aggregate excess demand.
Even when con¿ned to the special cases in which an -￿ can be found, examples can be
constructed where the -￿ does not represent, in welfare terms, the agents whose aggregate
actions it reproduces.
Most importantly, the -￿ might be ”non-structural”. More explicitly, the -￿ that is
appropriate before a given policy shock could well be different from the -￿ that will be
appropriate after the shock (Geweke, 1985)￿ clearly this would imply that the response of the
aggregate economy to theshock would be misrepresented by theresponse of the-￿recovered
from data that do not include the shock. But this squarely contradicts the presumption
6 It should be stressed that this paper is concerned with macroeconomics. Many of the problems that we
shall highlight would not arise if the focus of the analysis were the explanation of individual behaviour, using
individual rather than aggregate data. A survey of results on aggregation and microfoundations of dynamic
macroeconomics can be found in Forni and Lippi (1997).11
underlying the -￿-. approach and implies that it suffers from the same logical dif¿culty
that was originally imputed to the traditional approach. Geweke’s point cannot simply be
brushed aside: it is a fatal blow.
Yet it has been happily ignored,
4 possibly because the model used to highlight the non-
structurality of the -￿ did not belong to the class of models to which the Lucas critique
was originally directed, as it did not require future expectations regarding policy variables.
The main goal of this paper is to show that Geweke’s result is in fact robust, since the non-
structurality of the -￿ is a fairly general feature of models with heterogeneous agents and
rational expectations. We substantiate this claim in two ways.
First, we set up an ”experimental world” populated by heterogeneous, in¿nitely living,
rational economic agents, who make their decisions taking into account an exogenous
(stochastic) process governing a (pay-off relevant) policy variable, as well as a random
idiosyncratic shock (Section 2). Following the spirit of the -￿-. approach, we then
recover from the parameters of an aggregate decision rule obtained either by exact aggregation
of deterministic, steady-state values (Section 3), or by constrained maximum likelihood
estimation (Section 5) the (supposedly) deep parameters of the agent whose choice would
be equal to the average of the individual agents’ choices (the representative agent, in other
words) and use that knowledge to predict the response of the economy to a policy regime shift.
We compare that prediction with the true response, obtained through direct aggregation of the
actual individual responses. The comparison shows that the -￿ response can be very different
from the true one. The reason for the difference lies, as anticipated, in the non-structurality
of the -￿: the deep parameters recovered before the policy shock are different from those
recovered afterwards. To put it differently, the deep parameters of the -￿ are not deep at all,
since they are a function of the policy parameters.
5
7 To consider just one representative example, the recent macroeconomic textbook by Turnovsky (1995) -
largely centred around the UD device - while quoting Kirman paper as an example of critical reaction to the UD
paradigm, does not mention the possible non-structurality of the UD, which is instead very much stressed by
Kirman.
8 There is an additional reason to consider the UD parameters as ”shallow”, namely thefactthat, in general,
each of them will be some function of all the deep parameters of all the agents. As a result, what would be called
(say) the UD ”time discount factor” would in fact be a function of (say) individual technology parameters as well
as of individual time discount factors.12
It could be objected, however, that the conclusions that can be drawn from our
experiment aremodel-dependent, just asthose drawn from Geweke’sare. Our immediatereply
is that the model underlying our ”experimental world” is the prototype of those supported
by the -￿-. approach. To demonstrate the existence of non-structurality in our model is
tantamount to showing a fundamental ￿aw in that approach. There is a second way in which
we corroboratethe claim that the -￿ is in general non-structural. This provides a different and
perhaps even stronger reply to the above objection. We investigate analytically the nature of
non-structurality (Sections 4 and 5), identifying two separate instances of it. The ¿rst prevails
when idiosyncratic dynamic variables are aggregated and is a consequence of imposing on the
aggregate data a misspeci¿ed model, patterned on the model valid for the individual agents
(Sections 4.1 and 5.1). The second instance occurs when aggregating common exogenous
variables (typically, policy variables) whose coef¿cients in the individual decision rule are
functions which combine deep and policy parameters, and derives from the non-aggregability
of those functions. We show that a necessary and suf¿cient condition for this second kind of
non-structurality is that these functions be ”non-separable”, a notion we shall explain below
(Section 4.1). We also argue that this condition will be satis¿ed in almost all the models to
which the Lucas critique applies.
A by-product of our analysis is a comparison between the -￿-. and traditional
approaches showing that, contrary to Lucas’ claim, the latter is not necessarily worse than
the former (Section 4.2). Intuitively, the true response in the coef¿cients of the aggregate
decision rule to a change in the policy parameters might be greater than zero — which is
what the traditional approach would predicate — but smaller than that of the -￿ (recovered
using data from a period before the shock occurred), since the true response would be that of
ad i f f e r e n t-￿.
￿￿ 7KH VHW￿XS RI WKH H[SHULPHQW
In the ideal world where agents take decisions by optimizing over the in¿nite future
the (rationally) expected value of their objective function and where policy regime shifts are
publicly announced the Lucas critique unquestionably applies and his ”recipe” promises to be
most helpful. It is precisely that ideal world which our experiment replicates.13
We consider ￿ heterogeneous agents, namely ¿rms, facing a standard, well known
capital accumulation problem subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, taking as given
the (stochastic) process governing the rental rate (Hansen and Sargent, 1980￿ see also Ingram,
1995, upon which our discussion of the model properties is largely based). For each agent
the decision rule that solves the problem — which the assumptions made guarantee to have
a closed form — is simulated, generating a time series of values for the (individual) capital
stocks. Those time series are averaged across agents providing, together with the time series
for the rental rate, the aggregate data that are the input for the estimation.
6 The latter is carried
out following both the -￿-. and traditional approaches. A shock is then given to the rental
rate process parameters and the individual decision rules are recomputed. The true response
of the economy to the shock — i.e., the average of the individual time series thus obtained —
provides the natural benchmark against which the performance of the two approaches can be
assessed.
Before presenting the results of the experiment, and in order to introduce the notation,
it is useful to recall brie￿y the main features of the underlying model. Let ¿rm ￿, endowed
with a linear-quadratic production function and subject to quadratic adjustment costs, choose
the capital stock so as to maximize the present discounted value of its pro¿ts￿ i.e., let it solve,


































where: .f is the expectation operator conditional on the initial information￿
qc ￿c i and B are the discount factor and the technology parameters, respectively￿
o is the rental rate, exogenously given to the ¿rm￿
@ is a productivity shock.
In the following, we shall assume B, the parameter on which adjustment costs depend, to
be the same for all ¿rms￿ the rationale for this assumption will be made clear below. All other
parameters and productivity shocks are assumed, in the most general case, to be idiosyncratic
9 In line with Lucas’ prescription, we perform the estimation on data that pertain to the same policy regime.14
to ¿rm ￿.
7 To complete the description of the model, the stochastic processes underlying o and
@ have to be speci¿ed. The rental rate is the policy variable, for which the following stochastic
process is assumed:
o| ’ > n 4o|3￿ n 0|c with 0 ￿ ￿U(Efcj
2￿ and m4m ￿ ￿￿ (2)
The process generating the idiosyncratic productivity shocks for ¿rm ￿ is also assumed to be
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￿￿ and m#￿m ￿ ￿￿ (3)
Furthermore we assume that all the stochastic components are uncorrelated, both serially and
among themselves. Note that the linear-quadratic set-up of the model guarantees that a closed-
form expression for the decision rule can be easily computed. Following Ingram (1995), the
Euler condition characterising ¿rm ￿ optimal behaviour is:
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where b￿ is the stable root of the following equation:












potentially very relevant source of heterogeneity, namely the possibility that individuals’ payoff functions differ.15
and u is the lag operator.
8 Equations (4) and (2), one for each ¿rm, together with equation (3),
constitute our data generating process (DGP).











To provide a benchmark for the following analysis let us now brie￿y recall the steps needed
to recover the deep parameters. To this end, after dropping the index ￿ (i.e., assuming that all





















































































Note that ￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿ must satisfy #2 ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ’f , so that, given the error
structure, the following restriction — which in the words of Sargent is the hallmark of rational
expectations — can be imposed: l22￿￿2nl 2￿E# ￿ ￿22￿’f ,w h e r e# is a solution to the
quadratic equation above. This restriction should be taken into account at the estimation stage:
; Equation (4) can easily show the main point of the Lucas critique: a change in uw,i fc a u s e db yac h a n g e
in the policy parameter ￿,m o d i ¿es the parameters of the decision rule, which therefore cannot be considered as
structural. If, on the other hand, changes in uw are caused by a particular realisation of the stochastic disturbance,
then no change in the decision rule parameters is expected to take place (on the distinction between these two
sources of change in policy see Sims, 1982). The reduced form decision rule is therefore not equipped to make
correct inferences concerning the outcome of a change in policy.16
this in turn requires adopting a maximum likelihood approach.
9 Note that in this example qc
￿cBand j2 are not separately identi¿ed, and thus the value of one of these parameters must be
speci¿ed a priori. As mentioned above, in the following we will assume the parameter B to be
the same across all agents and known exactly a priori.
The structural parameters can be recovered as follows: B is speci¿ed a priori￿ > ’ ￿2,
j2 ’l 22, 4 ’ ￿22c










































With those values, the coef¿cients of the VAR in (6) can be modi¿ed to re￿ect a policymaker’s
intervention on (say) 4.A c c o r d i n gt ot h e-￿-. approach the correct prediction of the effects
of a change in o| due to the said intervention would thus obtain.
￿￿ ,PSOHPHQWLQJ WKH -￿-. DSSURDFK LQ D GHWHUPLQLVWLF ZRUOG
Reintroducing heterogeneity, we now carry out the experiment described in the previous
Section, that is wetry to recover the”deep”parameters oftheagent that representsthe(average
of the) simulated behaviour of ￿ ¿rms and we then compare the response by that agent (the
-￿) to a policy regime shift with the true response of the economy. The results are easier
< The approach outlined closely follows the original proposal by Lucas and Sargent and shows quite clearly
the need to disentangle deep from policy parameters in estimating decision rules. An alternative — and indeed
more frequently adopted — approach would be to estimate directly the Euler condition by GMM, to avoid the
structural instability that would affect the decision rule (4) were the policy rule (2) to be modi¿ed in the sample
period. In this respect note that, as we control the data generating process, we can avoid in-sample policy
breaks. Itis also important to realise that the problems of non-structurality thatwe shall beconcerned with would
appear essentially unchanged under the alternative procedure. In particular, recovering the aggregate decision
rule from the aggregation of the individual Euler equations is not equivalent to the straightforward aggregation
of the individual decision rules, as a non linear transformation is involved. We will take up this issue again when
discussing the sources of non-structurality.17
to interpret when the stochastic elements of the model are suspended, mainly because the
problems of estimation can be set aside and both the coef¿cients of the aggregate decision rule
and the deep parameters of the -￿ can be computed explicitly. To this we shall now turn,
before presenting the numerical results.
Let us then set both the errors in the policy and in the productivity processes to zero
and compute the aggregate stock of capital, &|, as a simple average of the individual capital
stocks.
10 Correspondingly, we can write the aggregate decision rule as a simple average of






















































will not be a constant.
Therefore the aggregate decision rule (7) differs from the individual rules in that it does not
have constant parameters. Indeed, much richer dynamics would be necessary to generate a
constant parameter aggregate equation, it being well known that the appropriate aggregation
procedure would ¿rst ”solve out” the (own) dynamics in each individual decision rule and
then aggregate the common driving variables (see Section 5 for additional discussion of this
issue). However the resulting equation could not be interpreted as the decision rule of an -￿
homologous to the individual agents.
If, however, we limit the analysis to steady states, it will be true that the aggregate data
are (exactly) represented by a constant parameter decision rule, similar to the individual ones,
of the form:
&| ’ kf n k￿&|3￿ n k2&|32 n k￿o|3￿c (8)
43 While different aggregation criteria could be considered that avoid some of the problems we shall high-
light, aggregation by sum or average characterizes national account time series.18
where the parameters of (8) are computed as functions of individual deep parameters and of












































































From the computed ks we can ¿nally recover the ”deep” parameters of the -￿,i . e . ,t h ev a l u e
of the parameters that, when assigned to a given agent, and under an unchanged policy regime,
wouldyield adecisionrulewhosecoef¿cientswouldbeequal to the ksin eqs. (9)-(12).
11 More
explicitly, given a value for the policy parameters, we could recover the ”deep” parameters of
the -￿, Eb
-￿c#-￿cq

























44 The UD will only represent the aggregate economy in steady state. Were a temporary shock to disturb the
















wheretheksaregivenby equations(9)-(12). Notethat thesystem can besolved in asomewhat
recursive fashion: ¿rst solve (15) and (16) simultaneously for b
-￿ and #-￿,
12 then solve (17)
for q
-￿ and ¿nally solve (14) for ￿-￿. For future reference, it is worth opening a brief
digression on the over-identifying constraints that are common in this kind of problem. In
fact, for a given value of B,t h e-￿ parameters are exactly identi¿ed in the system (14)-(17).
The cross equation restriction that was recalled in Section 2 is lost here, as a consequence of
our neglecting the stochastic component. Given that we are here abstracting from estimation
problems by actually computing the exact (steady state) coef¿cients, the loss of ef¿ciency
arising from the neglect of the restriction is immaterial.
It must however be remarked that an alternative strategy could have been followed to
recover the deep parameters of the -￿. We could have started from a structural representation
of the individual decision rule, obtained by multiplying both sides of equation (4) by E￿￿#u￿,
substituting1| for E￿￿#u￿@| and ¿nally, inline withtheassumptionmaintainedinthisSection,
setting 1| to zero:














Then, as before, we could have computed the aggregate, steady-state counterpart of (18) and
solved for the -￿ deep parameters that, appropriately combined with the (known) policy
parameters, yieldthecomputedcoef¿cients. It isapparent from(18) thatthe(absolutevalue)of
the ratio between the coef¿cient on o|3￿ and that on o| would provide the value of #-￿,w h i c h
subtracted from the coef¿cient on &|3￿ wouldgiveb
-￿. Theproduct of thesetwo values would
give then the coef¿cient on &|32 which, however, is also given independently. This would then
provide a constraint that should be imposed if we were to estimate the coef¿cients. Given that
45 It is worth remarking that, given the symmetry of the system (14)-(16), the method used to match the two
roots of the system with the two parameters ￿UD and ￿
UD is arbitrary. In the example below, we choose the
solutions in such a way that the values for the remaining parameters ￿
UD and ￿UD fall within the feasible set.20
we compute them by exact aggregation, this strategy cannot be pursued. Rather, it provides
a measure of the possible violation of the constraint in the aggregate data. We shall return to
this issue later.
For now, let us close the digression and suppose we have determined the values of the
deep parameters of the -￿ and want to predict the effect of a policy shock to the aggregate
economy by following the -￿-. approach. Even before we look at the numerical results, we
can anticipate that a number of problems would arise in carrying out this task.
First, the coef¿cients k￿ and k2 , from which the values of the b and # parameters of
the -￿ (eqs. (9)-(12)) should be recovered, are not functions only of the individual bsa n d#s.
From (9)-(12) and (14)-(17) it is clear that in general k￿ and k2 will also depend on qs, ￿s, B,
> and 4 (through the ”weights” &￿*&).
13 Therefore:
(a) the estimate of b
-￿ and #-￿ cannot be given any behavioural interpretation, as these
parameters would in fact also be a mixture also of all the other parameters of the agents.
Given that the estimate of the other deep parameters of the -￿ are conditional on the values
obtained for b
-￿ and #-￿, the same dif¿culty with the behavioural interpretation holds for
them as well.
(b) more importantly, the estimated b
-￿ and #-￿ would not be invariant vis-à-vis a policy
shift: if we introduce a change in 4 or in >, generate new individual data and aggregate, the
new steady state aggregate behaviour of the economy would be represented by a decision rule
similar in form to (8) but with different values for those coef¿cients — k￿ and k2 —th a tinth e
decision rule of the -￿ would be taken as invariant vis-à-vis the change in the policy. Hence,
the -￿ will not do its job, as it will misrepresent the (steady state) behaviour of the economy.
To put it differently, after the policy shift the data would lead to a different estimate for the
(supposedly) deep parameters b
-￿ and #-￿, so that the economy would be represented by a
different -￿: b
-￿ and #-￿ are not deep. Given that, as argued above, the estimate of the other
deep parameters of the -￿ is conditional on the values obtained for b
-￿ and #-￿, none of the
parameters is in fact deep.
Secondly, suppose that the individual ￿s where the same. It follows immediately from
(13) that the steady state value of the ratio &￿*& would be independent of the policy parameters
46 ReturningtotheEulerequation, wecannotethattheaggregation of individual¿rstorder conditions would
involve weighting individual deep parameters with terms of the form nl@n. Therefore, the problems highlighted
in the text for the decision rule also apply to the Euler equation.21
4 and > and, though the problem listed under (a) above would still be relevant, b
-￿ and #-￿
wouldat least be invariant in relationto thepolicy. As a result, the k￿ and k2 coef¿cients in the
-￿ decision rule would correctly be taken as unchanged. This would not, however, guarantee
that the -￿ response to the policy shift correctly represents the aggregate response. In other
words, even if b
-￿ and #-￿ are invariant vis-à-vis policy shifts, the remaining parameters
are not guaranteed to be deep. Consider a change from 4f to 4￿ (a change in > would have
similar implications). In the decision rule of the -￿ the coef¿cient on the policy variable will














. The true (post-shock)











. The numerical results, to which we
now turn, will show that k
￿￿
￿ is different from k
￿￿￿
￿ , so that q
-￿ is not deep and the response of
the -￿ to the policy shift does not match the aggregate response of the economy.
3.1 7KH QXPHULFDO UHVXOWV
To exemplify the above analysis we now consider ten different ¿rms with heterogeneous
parameters. In Table 1 the assumed parameters are listed, together with their means and
standard deviations. Assuming ¿rst a policy regime characterised by 4 and > equal to 0.55
and 1 respectively, we let each of the ¿rms compute its optimal investment decision according
to equation (6) — with the error terms set to zero. We then aggregate individual data and
use equations (9)-(12) to compute the coef¿cients of the steady state, aggregate decision
rule. These are shown in the ¿rst row of Table 2. The supposedly deep parameters of the
representative agent are computed by solving the system (14)-(17) and are shown in the
¿rst row of Table 3. The procedure is repeated in a new policy regime, characterized by
4 equal to 0.605 (a 10 per cent shock). The second rows of Tables 2 and 3 present the
corresponding ”true” decision rule coef¿cients and ”deep” parameters, that is the coef¿cients
(and associated behavioural parameters) that reproduce the actual aggregate, post-shock data.
It must be stressed that recomputing coef¿cients — and therefore ”deep” parameters — with
data relative to the new policy regime would obviously not be a viable procedure in real life.
By comparison, the third row of Table 2 gives the coef¿cients of the decision rule that would
beinferred wereone to follow the -￿-. approach — i.e., if the -￿parameters were deemed
to be structural.22
The numerical results — which con¿rm our previous analysis — show that the true
(post-shock) coef¿cients of lagged capital ￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿ (second row of Table 2) are different
from those inferred under the -￿-. approach (third row of Table 2), the latter being
incorrectly assumed to be independent of 4. The effects of the policy shift on the other
decision rule coef¿cients (second row of Table 2) are also different from those predicated
by the -￿-. approach (third row of Table 2). This failure to predict correctly the changes
in the decision rule coef¿cients in response to the policy shift is mirrored in the lack of
structurality of the behavioural parameters observed by comparing the ¿rst and second rows
of Table 3. As mentioned in the previous Section, non-structurality would occur also if the
individual parameters were modi¿ed so as to eliminate the dependence on 4 of the coef¿cients
representing the dynamic component of the decision rule. Tables 2.1 and 3.1 — obtained
following the same procedure adopted in Tables 2 and 3 but with the assumption that all
individual ￿sa r et h es a m e—c o n ¿rm this assertion. To stress further the non-structurality
of the -￿ parameters Figure 1 plots the functions relating the deep parameters to 4,i nt h e
general case in which the ￿s are different among agents.
It is worth mentioning that the value of the -￿ parameters need not be a convex
combination of the individual deep parameters. Moreover, it is very simple to select
individual parameter con¿gurations so that some of the -￿ parameters are outside the range
of admissible values. Yet these -￿ parameters are the only true ones, as they are the only
ones that, when assigned to a hypothetical agent, would give rise to a decision rule that
(in steady state and within a given policy regime) yields the true aggregate value. In these
circumstances, in spite of the linearity of the individual decision rules, there would be no
representative agent.
14
The numerical example allows us to highlight a ¿nal important point: the simulated
response of the economy to a policy shift obtained through the -￿-. approach is not
necessarily closer to the true response than the response resulting from the admittedly naïve
traditional approach, according to which all the coef¿cients of the decision rule would remain
47 As mentioned before, the cross equations constraint that characterises the problem is lost in our deter-
ministic set-up. If however we were to try to recover the UD parameters from a structural representation of the
aggregate decision rule following the procedure outlined in the previous section, we would discover that in gen-
eral there is no set of ”representative” parameters such that the aggregate coef¿cients are obtained from them
through equations (6).23
unchanged.
15 In Figure 2 we show these three responses (the data refer to the parameter
con¿guration underlying Tables 1-3, but qualitatively similar results would be obtained with
the parameters underlying Tables 2.1-3.1). The traditional approach outperforms the -￿-.
approach period by period. While we do not claim that this ranking is a general result —
indeed, it is easy to show parameter con¿gurations yielding theopposite ranking — we believe
it is remarkable that, even if the setting of the experiment is the most favourable to the -￿-.
approach one could think of — short of assuming homogeneous agents, that is — the latter is
nonetheless outperformed by its much despised contender.
It is worth mentioning that the traditional approach, which does not constrain the model
dynamics, could more easily cope with the (dynamic) misspeci¿cation problem. Also, by
extending the conditioning set, an approximation of the change of coef¿cients due to a policy
regime shift could be obtained. For the sake of comparability, we shall refrain from allowing
the traditional approach these ”degrees of freedom” and shall therefore be (purposely) unfair
to it. More generally, as the results we present below are critical of the -￿-. approach, we
shall adopt the methodological principle of choosing the ”battleground” most favourableto the
target of our criticism.
￿￿ ,QWHUSUHWLQJ WKH UHVXOWV
The numerical results clearly show that, in spite of the ideal conditions in which
our experiment is conducted — all ¿rms are rational, forward-looking, optimize over the
in¿nite future subject to production functions belonging to the same parametric class, discount
the future in the same qualitative way, are all simultaneously and completely informed of
the policy regime shift — the non-structurality of the -￿ is not a far-fetched possibility,
with relevant quantitative implications for the performance of the -￿-. approach, both in
absolute terms and in relation to the traditional approach. We believe that, given the almost
paradigmatic nature of the example considered, the non-existence of deep parameters for the
48 Since in recovering the UD parameters we are assuming knowledge of the true values of ￿ and ￿,a
simulation conditional on the actual values of the interest rate — as it is the use in the traditional approach — has
no advantage over the unconditional simulation required by the UDUH approach. In fact, the latter would yield
exactly the same results if a structural decision rule — obtained from the recovered ”deep” parameters — were
simulated.24
-￿ cannot be shrugged off as a theoretical FXULRVXP: it is a serious logical and practical
problem at the root of the -￿-. approach.
Yet an example, albeit prototypical, is still an example. Moreover, the origin of the non-
structurality is not immediately apparent from the example.
16 In fact, by exploring the nature
and possible sources of non-structurality of the -￿ we shall very naturally show it to be a
fairly general feature of models with rational expectations, thus strengthening the lesson that
can be drawn from our example.
To start our enquiry into the nature and causes of non-structurality, let us note that in the
example above we implicitly identi¿ed two different ways in which the non-structurality of
the -￿ can show up, corresponding to the two ways in which the coef¿cients of the aggregate
decision rule (8) might differ from the homologous coef¿cients in the individual decision
rules: the possibility that k￿ and k2, the coef¿cients of the (own) dynamic component of the
decision rule (8) — whose individual counterparts are independent of the policy parameters (>
and/or 4) — turn out to be a function of those parameters￿ the possibility that the functional
dependence on the policy parameters of k￿ and kf, the coef¿cients of the exogenous driving
forces of the decision rule, may be different from that of their individual counterparts so that,
for example, k
￿
￿ is different from k
￿￿
￿￿
17 It is worth remarking that the possibility of seeing these
two instances of non-structurality separately at work — as we did in Section 3.1 — is only
open in a deterministic world: as will be shown in Section 5, when the stochastic nature of
individual decision rules is taken into account the equality of the ￿s is no longer suf¿cient to
isolatetheimpactof thepolicy shifton k￿ and kf (that isonq
-￿ and ￿-￿).
18 The two instances
of non-structurality can be seen to stem from two logically independent sources. The ¿rst is
the imposition on the aggregate data of a dynamically misspeci¿ed model, patterned on the
individual decision rule. As shown above, the requirement that the aggregate decision rule
(8) have the same dynamic structure as the individual rules (¿rst equation of the system (6))
49 Indeed, a failure to identify the causes of the non structurality is perhaps the major weakness of the
otherwise very insightful paper by Geweke (1985), a weakness that might have contributed to the neglect with
which the profession welcomed it.
4: There is indeed a third way in which the parameters of the UD might fail to be deep, noted in Section 3
above. This would occur when the aggregate coef¿cients depend on deep parameters other than those appearing
in the expression of the homologous coef¿cients in the individual decision rules. We will keep the expression
”non-structural ” to refer to the dependence of the UD ”deep” parameters on the policy parameters, mainly
neglecting this other form of potential ”shallowness”.
4; This indeed is one of the reasons why it is useful to consider the deterministic case separately.25
implies that the coef¿cients of the dynamics, k￿ and k2, are a function of the ”weights” &￿*&
(seeequation (7)), which in turn areafunction of policy parameters. No terms of theform &￿*&
would be necessary if richer dynamics had been allowed for in the aggregation, as mentioned
above. As this issue will prove to have an inherent effect on the estimation step of the -￿-.
approach, a more detailed discussion is deferred to Section 5.1.
The second source, reminiscent of Jensen’s inequality, is the ”non-separability” — in a
s e n s et ob es p e c i ¿ed below — of the ”mixture” of deep and policy parameters that appears
in the individual decision rule coef¿cients pertaining to the exogenous driving forces. Under
non-separability, aggregation of the LQGLYLGXDO ”mixtures” will inextricably bind together deep
and policy parameters. We shall now turn to this source of non-structurality .
4.1 *HQHUDOL]LQJ WKH QRQ￿VWUXFWXUDOLW\ RI WKH -￿
As already argued, proponents of the -￿-. approach should be somewhat disturbed by
the possibility that the -￿ is non-structural precisely in the model they favour to illustrate its
”mechanics”. In fact, we intend to show that non-structurality essentially plagues all rational
expectationmodels. There is a preliminary issue that weneedtoget out of the way, namely the
question as to whether results concerning the non-structurality of the-￿inalinear framework
are of any general relevance and, more speci¿cally, are robust to non-linear generalizations.
There are a number of reasons to conclude that they are indeed both.
First and most importantly, if there are aggregation problems in a linear framework,
they can only become worse in a non-linear one, according to the most obvious of Jensen’s
inequality-type of arguments: as the sum over ￿ of a non-linear function of a variable %￿,
￿ ’ ￿c2￿￿￿￿, is different from the same non-linear function of the sum over ￿ of the variables
%￿,thereisnowayattheaggregatelevel—that isforthe-￿—topreservethesamefunctional
form valid at the individual level.
19 In fact, moving away from a linear-quadratic setting, the
agents’ optimization problem would in general not even have a closed form solution. In these
circumstances, either we linearize the original problem around the steady state — thereby
returning the linear-quadratic world — or we try to estimate — by a generalized method of
4< There is, of course, the possibility of approximate aggregation. It might be argued that the UD is indeed
non-structural, but only slightly so. Given that the UD can be grossly non-structural in a linear framework, we
¿nd this argument unconvincing.26
moments or by simulation
20 — Euler conditions that, being non-linear, suffer from problem of
the Jensen’s inequality type mentioned above.
Secondly, the linear-quadratic setting encompasses some interesting models that have
been proposed to study consumption and permanent income, the dynamic demand for factors
of production and many other issues. Even if issues involving risk aversion cannot be seriously
addressed in that framework, there is nevertheless a large class of problems that can be
explored fruitfully under the simplifying assumption of linearity.
Thirdly, in keeping with the methodological principle of choosing the ”battleground”
most favourable to the target of our criticisms, the linear-quadratic framework is the obvious
choice, given the extensive use that contributors to the -￿-. approach have made of it.
In sum, we believe that there are enough reasons to stick with linear decision rules. In
any event, this is what we shall do. Moving now to the core of our argument, let us ¿rst
note that the distinction we were able to draw in our example between two different forms
of non-structurality — one related to the aggregation of idiosyncratic dynamics and a second
one arising from the aggregation of common exogenous variables — can be maintained in a
large class of linear-quadratic, rational expectation problems. It can be easily veri¿ed that in
the class of so-called ”augmented linear regulator problems”
21 (Hansen and Sargent, 1981),
the coef¿cients of the dynamic terms in the decision rule are functions only of the individual
parameterswhile the coef¿cient of theexogenous (policy) variableis a(non-linear) function of
the individual and policy parameters, as in our example. The latter conclusion — crucial to our
purpose — is of a very general nature. Indeed, to the extent that we can refer to ”coef¿cients”
in non-linear decision rules, it is obvious that, even beyond the linear-quadratic setting, at
least some of the coef¿cients of the agents decision rule must be a mixture of deep and policy
parameters for the Lucas critique to apply.
53 It ispossibletoestimatethedeep andpolicyparametersof stochasticgeneralequilibriummodelsby agen-
eralized method of moments or by simulation, using either the simulated MLE or simulated method of moments
or indirect inference. The GMM method exploits orthogonality conditions originating from the maximization
problem of the agent to create a quadratic function which has to be minimized with respect to the parameters.
The estimation by simulation is based on the possibility of simulating the desired model, so as to use the simu-
lated data to generate proper moment conditions to be used in the estimation A general survey of the results of
estimation by simulation is given by Gourieroux and Monfort (1996).
54 More explicitly, this is the class of optimal control problems with quadratic objective function and linear
constraints in the presence of exogenous policy variables.27
Suppose then that one of those coef¿cients is given by s Eq￿c4￿,w h e r eq￿ is the
(individual) deep parameter and 4 is thepolicy parameter and where, for the sake of simplicity,
we are considering the special case in which q￿ is a scalar. Note also that, maintaining the
assumption made in the previous section, we shall side-step estimation problems and recover
the (supposedly) deep parameter in question directly by ”inverting” the function s,g i v e na
value for the policy parameter 4. More explicitly, the -￿ parameter q













for a given value of 4. Here and in the following we shall assume that the hypotheses of the
implicit function theorem are satis¿ed, so that implicit equations like (19) above always have
a solution. An example of equation (19) is given by equation (16) above.
O n c eav a l u eq
-￿ has been determined, according to the -￿-. approach we could
predict how the economy would react to a policy shift from 4f to 4￿ (say) by changing the










.F o r t h i s
change in the value of the coef¿cient to be correct it must be that the value of q
-￿ that solves
equation (19) for 4f also solves it for 4￿ or, more generally, that q
-￿ is not a function of 4.
Equivalently, it must be that q












where s4 is the partial derivative with respect to 4.I n d e e d ,i fq
-￿ is not a function of 4 we can
simply take a derivative with respect to 4 on both sides of (19) to get (20). On the other hand,
by applying the implicit function theorem to (19) and using (20) we immediately obtain that
the derivative of q
-￿ with respect to 4 is identically zero.
However, it is readily apparent that the system (19) and (20) will in general have no
solution, since it is a system of two equations and one unknown. More precisely, the system
(19) and (20) will have a unique solution for every 4 if and only if the function s4 is an af¿ne
transformation of the function s, that is if and only if we can write:28
s4 Eqc4￿’ZfE4￿nZ￿E4￿s Eqc4￿c (21)
for an appropriate choice of the ”weights” ZfE4￿ and Z￿E4￿.
The suf¿ciency of condition (21) for the solution of the system is obvious. To prove
necessity, ¿rst of all note that (21) is equivalent to the existence of a constant S, possibly













Consider now the system (19) - (20) in the simplest case ￿ ’2 , and assume it has a solution.
By adding an arbitrary constant S to both sides of (20) and rearranging the terms we can




















It is clear that we can choose the constant S in such a way that theexpression in square brackets
is zero for each ￿. Hence, in light of (22), (21) holds. This conclusion can then be extended to
any ￿ by induction.
Summing up thus far, there will be a structural -￿ , i.e., independent of the policy
regime, if and only if the function s is such that condition (21) is satis¿ed. It can easily be
checked that the condition is not satis¿ed for the function implicitly de¿ning q
-￿ in (17).
We can provide a more transparent characterization of the class of functions which allow the
possibility ofrecoveringastructural-￿parameter. Firstade¿nitionandanauxiliarytechnical
result are needed. We shall call a function sEqc4￿ VHSDUDEOH if we can write it as follows:
22
s Eqc4￿’￿￿E4￿n￿2E4￿} Eq￿ (24)
for some functions ￿￿, ￿2 and }. We can then prove the following auxiliary result:
55 Notethatour de¿nition of separability is notsymmetrical since it assigns differentroles topolicyanddeep
parameters.29
A function sEqc4￿ is VHSDUDEOH if and only if the function
sqqEqc4￿
sqEqc4￿ does not depend on 4,w h e r e
subscripts denote partial derivatives.
3URRI￿ The suf¿ciency is obvious: simply take the required derivatives of the -M7 of (24)









￿Eq￿, where the primes,
as usual, indicates derivatives. Now integrate both sides of (25) with respect to q, to obtain:
,J}EsqEqc4￿￿ ’ ,J}E}
￿
Eq￿￿ n )E4￿c (26)
where )E4￿ is the constant of integration that we take, in full generality, to be a function of 4.
Moreover, we can write, again without loss of generality, that )E4￿ ’ *L}E￿2E4￿￿. Therefore,




Integrate now both sides of (27) with respect to q to get:
sEqc4￿’}Eq￿￿2E4￿n￿￿E4￿c (28)
where ￿￿E4￿ is the constant of integration.
We are now ready to prove the following claim:
The system (19)-(20) admits a solution q
-￿ - or, equivalently, it is possible to recover from
equation (19) a value for the behavioural parameter of the -￿that is independent of the policy
— if and only if the function sEqc4￿ is separable.
3URRI￿ We need to show that condition (21) is equivalent to separability of the s, that is
to condition (24). That separability should imply (21) is fairly obvious, as it only requires
taking the appropriate derivative of the s, under (24), and rearranging the terms. Indeed, the30
suf¿ciency of separability for the structurality of the solution q
-￿ can be established directly
by checking that, in (19), the solution for q
-￿ would not involve terms in 4. As for necessity,







’ f. Equivalently, separability holds iff:
sqq4Eqc4￿sqEqc4￿ ￿ sq4Eqc4￿sqEqc4￿’f ￿ (29)





Z￿E4￿EsqqEqc4￿sqEqc4￿ ￿ sqqEqc4￿sqEqc4￿ ￿’f
(32)
Therefore, (21) implies separability.
Summing up thus far, we have shown that — even if the dependence on the policy
parameter brought about by the dynamics is neglected — the -￿ parameter will be structural
only when the coef¿cient on the policy variable in the individual decision rule mixes deep
and policy parameters in a ”separable” way. Given that any aggregate decision rule which
is potentially subject to the Lucas critique must involve at least one coef¿cient that can be
expressed as a function of deep and policy parameters, our result provides a general necessary
and suf¿cient condition for the viability of the -￿-. approach. To put it differently, our
result characterizes in a fairly general way the conditions under which the non-structurality of
the -￿, ¿rst pointed out by Geweke, occurs.
Two questions naturally arise: does the result hinge on the simplifying assumption
whereby only a scalar deep parameter has been considered? how likely will separability be?
As to the ¿rst, let us simply note that the above arguments can be extended with only
minor changes to the case in which the -￿ ”deep” parameter is a vector and, correspondingly,31
there is a certain number of coef¿cients in the decision rule
23 —b e a r i n gi nm i n dt h a tt h e
presence of idiosyncratic dynamic terms will be a source of non-structurality SHU VH. Turning
now to the likelihood of separability, we can note that in all linear-quadratic problems we
wouldendupsolvingtheEulerequationbyeliminatingthefutureexpectedvaluesofthepolicy
variable. This in turn involves inextricably bounding together the subjective evaluation of the
future and the objective law of motion of the policy variable, so that the non-separability of
deep and policy parameters will result. To takejust oneexample, if the Euler equation involves
at e r ml i k e
S
|’fq
|.fEo|￿ where q is the subjective discount factor, and if o| follows an AR(1)
process with autoregressive parameter 4￿￿, we would end up with a term ￿
￿3q4 multiplying
o|, clearly non-separable. A similar conclusion would hold for any AR(?) process. Given our
result, this means that the non-structurality of the -￿, far from being a non -generic FXULRVXP,
is an almost sure consequence of heterogeneity.
4.2 ,V WKH -￿-. DSSURDFK QHFHVVDULO\ EHWWHU WKDQ WKH WUDGLWLRQDO RQH"
W es h o w e d ,i nS e c t i o n3 . 1 ,t h a tt h e-￿-. approach can be dominated by the
traditional one. This clearly follows from the non-structurality of the -￿, which induces
a misrepresentation of the true aggregate response. Since the traditional approach also
misrepresents the true response (as it does not take into account at all the response of the
coef¿cients in the aggregate decision rule), we are left with the comparison — D SULRUL
ambiguous — between two approximate representations of the truth. Our ambition is to say
something more than this essentially agnostic conclusion. Before becoming involved in more
formal arguments, it is useful to spell out the simple intuition underlying them: if aggregation
produces attenuation of the response to a given shock, then the response of the -￿ will be
”excessive”and adampened response(such asthat provided by thetraditionalapproach) might
be closer to the true one.
To ￿esh out that intuitive explanation, let us start by noting that the policy parameters
show up in the coef¿cients of the -￿ decision rule to take care, as it were, of (the anticipation
of) the future levels of the policy variable. In particular, the (absolute value of the) response to
56 The strategy of proof followed can be kept essentially unchanged, with separability de¿ned as in (24)
for each of the functions de¿ning the coef¿cients of the decision rule and allowing ￿ to be a vector. The only
modi¿cations required are: (1) in the proof of the auxiliary result the condition that the ratio of derivaties is
independent of ￿ for all l and m has to be imposed, generalising the condition required for the scalar case￿ (2) in
the proof of the claim, all the cross-derivatives have to be computed.32
a current policy regime shift would in general be greater than the mere response to a change
in the level of the current policy variable. The latter, instead, is the response of the traditional
approach, which would only account for theeffect of the policy parameters on the current level
of the policy variable. Therefore it seems reasonable to assume that, in comparison with the
-￿-. approach, the traditional one ”underreacts”.
24
If that is the case, a necessary (though not suf¿cient) condition for the traditional
approach to be closer than the -￿-. approach to the actual response of the aggregate is that,
with respect to thetrueaggregate response, the -￿-. approach ”overreacts”. To clarify when
the latter condition can be satis¿ed, let us note that, without loss of generality — equation (5)
providing just one example — the deterministic steady state value of the individual decision
variable can be written as:
&
￿ ’ ￿Eq￿c4￿c (33)
where for simplicity we consider only one idiosyncratic deep parameter and only one policy
parameter. The steady state value of the aggregate decision, &￿C ’ ￿
￿
S
&￿ , is then:
&
￿C ’ ￿EqE4￿c4￿c (34)




￿Eq￿c4￿. Note that the ”deep” parameter is explicitly
considered a function of the policy parameter, following our previous analysis.




57 The claim in the text needs two qualifying remarks. The ¿rst is that it assumes that the expected future
changes in the level of the policy variable are of the same sign as the initial one. This will often be the case,
however, given that the policy regime shift is engineered precisely to produce those changes. Therefore it seems
verylikelythatthechange inthedecision rulecoef¿cientwouldbuttress thereaction to thecurrentpolicyvariable
level. ThesecondremarkisthattheclaimneglectsthepossibilitythatinderivingtheUDdecisionruleaconstraint
is imposed which is not in fact satis¿ed by the aggregate data. This would make the comparison between the
(absolute value of the ) reaction under the UDUH and the traditional approaches a priori ambiguous.33
where q
-￿ ’ q E4￿ for the particular value of 4 that generated the data used in computing
the coef¿cients of the aggregate decision rule. For that value of 4, then, (34) and (35) are
numerically identical.
The difference between these two decision rules appears when we try to use them to
predict the response of the economy to a policy regime shift, namely to a change in 4.
Intuitively, the -￿-. approach would account for the effect of 4 on the current level of o
as well as considering how the -￿, anticipating that the change in 4 would affect future values
of o, would modify its reaction to the current level of o. The true aggregate would, in addition,
take into account the change that the aggregation process induces in the ”identity” of the RA.
More formally, let us compute, in thetwo cases, thederivativeof the steady state & withrespect










where the functions are all evaluated at the same pointEq
-￿c4￿, with q
-￿ ’ qE4￿. Combining










Equation (38) makes it clear that there will be an overreaction whenever the change in the
”identity” of the -￿ (
_qE4￿
_4 ) has an impact on the aggregate decision (￿qEqc4￿
_qE4￿
_4 )w h i c h
(partially) offsets the straightforward response of the RA (￿4Eq
-￿c4￿). More formally, we can







Condition (39) involves explicit reference to the aggregation process, as it is a function of
the change in the -￿ that is brought about by the policy shift. It is possible, however,
to reformulate that condition so that it only involves properties of the function ￿￿
25 The
58 It can easily be shown, by reproducing the Arrow-Pratt derivation of the (approximate) expression for the34
aggregation process implies that there is not a clear cut answer to the question and the
conditions in (39) leave open the possibility that a traditional rule (¿xed coef¿cients) would be
a better approximation of the true response.
￿￿ ,PSOHPHQWLQJ WKH -￿-. DSSURDFK LQ D VWRFKDVWLF ZRUOG
The assumption that all error terms are zero — which proved useful to highlight the
different sources of non-structurality and to simplify the derivation of the analytical results
— might be considered unnatural for the analysis of an approach that stresses sophisticated
estimation techniques. More importantly, it could be argued that our numerical or analytical
results would be changed in a stochastic world.
To the contrary, we shall now show that, if anything, the -￿-. approach faces
even deeper problems when that assumption is dropped. More explicitly, we shall present
numerical results that con¿rm the non-structurality of the estimated ”deep” parameters of the
-￿￿ we shall also show that the misspeci¿cation of the estimated (aggregate) model implies
unavoidable non structurality, which combines with the one arising from non separability, as
in the deterministic case￿¿ nally, we shall point out the aggravating role of imposing a cross
equation constraint which, though valid for each ¿rm, is not satis¿ed by the aggregate data.
risk premium, that:











where ￿ is the average of the ￿v and ￿5









Substituting this in the top equation, and assuming that the various derivatives of the function k involved do not
change sign in their range of de¿nition, we can reformulate (39) as a condition on the sign of an expression only







As recalled in Section 2, in the case of a linear-quadratic decision process — the one we
are considering in our experiment — the estimation can be performed by maximum likelihood
on the reduced form of the solution of the model, imposing the relevant non-linear cross-
equation restrictions. This is the approach that we shall follow to recover the supposedly deep
parameters of the -￿.
5.1 7KH QXPHULFDO UHVXOWV
The set-up of the experiment we performed is identical to that described in Section 3.1,
both for the values of the individual deep parameters and for the shock given to the policy
process. The only difference is that — in the ante-shock regime — each ¿rm computes
its optimal capital stock in a stochastic environment, with shocks to both the idiosyncratic
productivity and theinterest rate processes.
26 As a result, it is no longer possible to compute by
exact aggregation a constant-coef¿cients, aggregate decision rule — not even in a steady state
— and we need to resort to estimation. As mentioned above, we recover the -￿ parameters
from a constrained maximum likelihood estimate of the coef¿cients of the aggregate decision
rule, usingdatafromtheante-shockregime. Weuseasampleof90000observationsessentially
to eliminate sample variability and small sample bias which can induce spurious dependence
of the ”deep” parameters from the policy one. The ¿r s tr o w so fT a b l e s4a n d5p r e s e n tt h e
estimated coef¿cients and the implied ”deep” parameters. Differently from the deterministic
case, we cannot claim these coef¿cients (and implied -￿ parameters) to be strictly ”true”, as
they cannot reproduce exactly the aggregate capital stock. Given the size of the sample they
are, however, a close approximation to the probability limit of the — possibly misspeci¿ed —
estimated model under the true DGP — that is, they can be interpreted as pseudo-true values
of the corresponding population parameters. The second rows of the two Tables present the
corresponding values obtained by repeating the procedure using an equally long sample drawn
entirely from the post-shock regime. Given the nature of pseudo-true values of these estimates,
the logic of the -￿-. approach would be seriously called into question were the parameters
to change, as they would no longer have any claim to being deep or structural. Equivalently,
serious troubles for the -￿-. approach would be signalled by sizeable differences between
these ”actual” post-shock decision rule coef¿cients and the coef¿cients — shown in the third
59 The variance of the both idiosyncratic and policy innovations were set equal to 0.01.36
row of Table 4 — recomputed by taking into account the policy change and assuming all -￿
parameters to be unchanged. As it is apparent from the Tables, neither the ”inferred” decision
rule coef¿cients (third row of Table 4) nor the ante-shock -￿ parameters (¿rst row of Table 5)
are equal to, respectively, the actual decision rule coef¿cients (second row of Table 4) and the
post-shock -￿ parameters (second row of Table 5).
It is interesting to note that, differently from the deterministic case, the equality of the
individual ￿s is not suf¿cient to guarantee that the coef¿cients on the lagged capital stocks in
the aggregate decision rule (￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿) are independent of policy changes. This is shown
in Table 4.1, where the procedure leading to Table 4 is repeated after the individual deep
parameters have been modi¿ed accordingly. In a stochastic environment, then, the two sources
of non-structurality previously identi¿ed cannot be disentangled. The non-structurality of the
-￿parameters is graphically exempli¿ed in Figure 3, wherethe functions relating the pseudo-
truevalueof thedeep parameters to4are plotted, with each corresponding parameter being the
estimate computed using data generated consistently with the corresponding value
27 of 4.T h e
graph highlights the non-linear dependency of the supposedly deep parameters on the policy
parameter.
In order to check the estimation results and the appropriatedness of the sample size, we
performed the same experiment considering a single agent economy with parameter values
equal to the averages used in the heterogenous case and with the same sample size. The
variability of the deep parameters in this case is insigni¿cant and of the order of magnitude of
one percent of that present in the heterogenous case.
5.2 ,QWHUSUHWLQJ DQG JHQHUDOL]LQJ WKH UHVXOWV
As shown in Section 4, in the context of a deterministic DGP, a source of non-
structurality ofthe-￿can ariseif thedynamicsoftheaggregatemodel arerequired tobeequal
to the dynamics of individual decision rules, thus forcing a misspeci¿ed model onto aggregate
data. The misspeci¿cation would disappear, however, in a deterministic steady state. We now
analyze theissuein greater detail, showing that, once thestochasticnature of thedecision rules
is taken into account, the attempt to estimate the same model that is appropriate for individual
5: Todrawthegraphs, wesimulatedandestimatedthemodelforfortydifferentvaluesofthepolicyparameter
￿ on the interval +3=84> 3=;6, using the same underlying set of innovations.37
agents, using aggregate data, is bound to generate dynamic misspeci¿cation. In turn, the latter
will induce a dependence of the estimated parameters of the misspeci¿ed model on all the
parameters of the true underlying model￿ in particular, on the policy parameters.
Generalizing our example, while retaining linearity of the decision rule and simplifying
to a scalar deep parameter, we can generically write the result of the intertemporal maximizing





| nXE u￿Eq￿c4￿o|3￿c (40)
where, in keeping with the notation of the example, &￿
| is the action of agent ￿ in time |, q￿ is
his deep parameter, 0￿
| is the idiosyncratic shock component, o is the policy variable, 4 is the
policy parameter
28 and xc [ and X are lag polynomials, respectively of (¿nite) order R, ^ and
,
29. Note that equation (40) implicitly de¿nes a set non linear cross equation restriction as the
same deep and policy parameters appear as arguments of all lag polynomials.
If however agents’ parameters differ, then the DGP that generates the aggregate data can
differ quite dramatically from all individual decision rules, as the sum of ARMAX processes
is still an ARMAX but of different order lag￿ in particular, if the individual decision rule is















E[Eu￿E q￿c4￿0￿| nXE u￿E q￿c4￿o|3￿￿c
which is still an ARMAX but of order E￿ ￿ RcE￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ R n ^c E￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ R n ,￿. Note that
if all the roots of the polynomials x and [ are equal across agents and the aggregate model
5; The idea is that the DGP of the policy variable is a function of some stochastic components and some
parameters ￿. Thepresence of both the parameters and the policy variable derives from the fact that in most cases
(40) will be the solution to a rational expectation problem in which the agent’s action today is a function of the
expected value of the future policy and to compute those the agent uses the knowledge of the DGP of the policy
variable. More precisely, we assume that different agents will discount differently the future policy and this is
one of the origin of the non-linear mixing between policy and individual taste parameters.
5< The ¿nite order of the polynomials is not a restriction given that every linear process can be approximated
to any degree of precision by a ¿nite lag polynomial representation.38
has the same ARMA structure as the agents’ and, on top of that, the coef¿cients of X have
the separability property as given in Section (4.1), then (41) is nested into (40) and the model
(40) is not misspeci¿ed for the aggregate data. Naturally, this is the case if all parameters
(including those determining the stochastic properties of the idiosyncratic disturbances) are
the same across agents, in which case the aggregate data will be consistent with the same DGP
underlying each individual’s behaviour and a perfect aggregation can be carried out.












and assume that in this economy there are only two agents, ￿ ’￿ c 2 and the policy variable o
follows an AR(1) process with coef¿cient 4 and innovation ￿| ￿ ￿U(Efcj 2
￿￿￿ the aggregate
DGP is obtained by solving (42) for & in function only of the exogenous variable and the
innovation and by then summing over ￿:
&| ’E q￿ n q2￿&|3￿ ￿ Eq￿q2￿&|32 n 4o|3￿ ￿
￿
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so that while the original model was an ARMAX(1,0,0) the aggregate one is an
ARMAX(2,1,1).
It is worth stressing that the dif¿culty with aggregation lies in the presence of
idiosyncratic dynamic terms. These, however, will almost invariably be part of the decision
rule of forward-looking rational agents, at least as long as the problem is genuinely
intertemporal — i.e., it cannot be reduced to a sequence of unrelated static problems — which
in turn is a precondition for the future to overshadow the present and for the parameters of
the policy process to show up in the coef¿cients of the decision rule: in a word, for the Lucas
critique to apply. We can then conclude that whenever a representative agent decision rule
mirroring the individual one is estimated on the aggregate data, the resulting model will be
misspeci¿ed.39
The misspeci¿cationimpliesthat the-￿is non-structural. Moreprecisely, theestimated
parameters of equation (40) will converge to their pseudo-true values under the actual DPG,
given by equation (41). As a result, the pseudo-true values of the estimate will be a function
of all the parameters of the aggregate DGP (41). Hence, the estimated parameters that the
approach identi¿es as structural are not independent of policy shifts: once again, the deep
parameters are in fact not deep at all, so that any prediction about the aggregate reaction to a
change in policy is bound to be biased.
30 To illustrate this result let us consider equations (42)
and (43). By imposing on the aggregate DGP (43) a model of the same form as the individual
DGPs, (42) amounts to omitting two variables from the estimate and neglecting the moving
average structure of the disturbances. The estimates of the ”deep” parameters will thus be a
function of everything that has been omitted. This can be seen from the form of the probability
limit of the parameter of the lagged endogenous variable, q, when equation (42) is estimated


























where ￿& Ef￿ is the unconditional variance of &. Even if the actual correlation has not been
explicitly written, it is immediately evident that in the numerator of the second term on the
RHS of the above expression 4 does not cancel out, so that the probability limit of q will be
function of 4￿
31 The instance of non-structurality that the above result highlights is similar to
the ¿rst of the two identi¿ed in Section 4 — where the aggregate decision rule coef¿cients
were obtained by explicit aggregation — as both stem from the misspeci¿cation of the model
imposed on aggregate data. There is a difference, however. While it can be easily veri¿ed
that, paralleling the analysis in Section 3, a deterministic steady state, aggregate decision rule
63 It is possible to show that in the general case of linear decision rule, with a large number of agents, the
pseudo-true value of the estimates of the representative agent model are a function both of the policy parameters
andofameasureoftheheterogeneityoftheagents, givenbythevarianceofthedistributionofthetasteparameters
across agents.
64 It is worth pointing out that the dependence of the pseudotrue value of the coef¿cient in the aggregate
model from the policy parameter would arise even were ￿ not present in the individual decision rule, as the
estimated model is misspeci¿ed. As a result, the estimated equation is missing some lags of the policy variable -
which are indeed a function of the policy parameter ￿ - and it is through that channel that the pseudotrue value of
the taste coef¿cient ends up being a function of ￿.40
could be obtained from (42) where the coef¿cient of the lagged dependent variable does not
depend on 4, the limit in probability of its estimate was shown to depend on 4.
32 On the other
hand, it is worth noting that these differences are more apparent than real, as in a stochastic
environment the steady stateis never attained and thecoef¿cient computed —p er io db yp e rio d
— by aggregation would end up being a function of 4 as well.
33
The non-structurality of the -￿ induced by misspeci¿cation is then a pervasive
characteristic of the -￿-. approach when implemented in ”real life” circumstances, as it
neglects the fact that the aggregate DGP does not mimic any individual decision rule. In
addition it should not be forgotten, of course, that the second cause of non-structurality —
which was shown in Section 4 to be the non-separability of the function of deep and policy
parameters representing (at least one of) the coef¿cients of the individual decision rule — is
still at work, even in a stochastic world. Differently from the deterministic case, in which we
were able to isolate it, that source of non-structurality will always be mixed with the ¿rst, since
— as argued above — individual decision rules will almost invariably possess idiosyncratic
dynamics, which in turn is suf¿cient to produce non-structurality of the ¿rst kind.
To tie up two loose ends of Section 3 (and 5), the issues of the cross equation constraint
and of ”bizarre” parameters estimates need to be addressed. As we veri¿ed in Section 4,
heterogeneity of agents implies in general that the non-linear cross equation restrictions that
hold at the micro level are not necessarily consistent with the aggregate data. If, nevertheless,
we impose these constrains in estimation we introduce a further source of misspeci¿cation,
which is added to the previous one. More explicitly, imposing a representative model implies
that we arerestricting the analysisto aclass of models that does not include thedatagenerating
process of the aggregate data￿ if we also impose cross equation restrictions which are not
actually satis¿ed, this will narrow the search to an even smaller class of model, which is, in a
way, more misspeci¿ed than the true model.
Finallyit is worthytomentionthat —inspiteofthelargesampleused—veryfrequently
the estimates of the aggregate decision rule coef¿cients implied extreme values for some of
65 The numerical results in Section 5.1 show that the estimates of the dynamic terms are non-structural even
in those circumstances - when the ￿s are all equal - in which the deterministically computed coef¿cients would
be independent of ￿.
66 Indeed, in a stochastic environment there would be no exact, constant parameter aggregate decision rule.41
the ”deep” parameters, sometimes outside the admissible range. Indeed, a qualitatively similar
phenomenon was seen to occureven inthemost favourablecaseinwhich thecoef¿cients ofthe
aggregate decision rule could be computed by exact aggregation. The presence of non-linear
cross equation restrictions implies that the deep parameters are recovered through non-linear
transformations of the reduced form coef¿cient estimates. The non-linear transformation can
easily induce large changes in the variance of the estimated deep parameters. It is therefore
possible that even if the econometrician is able to recover quite precise estimates of the reduce
form parameters, the non-linear transformation of these can present a very large variance. So
it is not infrequent to recover fairly bizarre deep parameters.
￿￿ &RQFOXVLRQV
The device of interpreting macroeconomic phenomena as corresponding to the
optimizing behaviour of a (large) -￿ is — as a cursory look at the most recent macro
textbooks will con¿rm — a corner-stone of modern, micro-founded macroeconomic theory.
Fromanempiricalpointof view, the-￿device¿ndsitssupport inthepossibilityofrecovering
(aggregate) deep parameters from aggregate data.
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Our results, which expound and strengthen arguments outlined in Geweke (1985) and
Kirman (1992), clearlyimplythat that research programislogically faulty, asthereisno reason
to expect that the aggregate economy behaves as a single optimizing agent, suitably chosen,
even in the most favourable circumstance in which each and every agent in the economy
behaves in that way.
This leaves economists in a very uncomfortable position. If we cannot interpret
aggregate data with the conceptual framework provided by microeconomic theory, should we
limit ourselves to take note of broad aggregate correlations and hope that they will persist?
As is often the case in economics, a ”corner” solution is not the optimal one. Neither
ascribing ”OHJLWLPDF\ RQO\ WR PRGHOV WKDW DUH H[DFW DJJUHJDWLRQ RI DJHQWV ZKR RSWLPL]H VXEMHFW
67 Critics of this program are usually not taken very seriously. To quote just one example, while Kirman
(1992) original wording was hardly ambiguos ”LW LV FOHDU WKDW WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLYH DJHQW GHVHUYHV D GHFHQW EXULDO￿
DV DQ DSSURDFK WR HFRQRPLF DQDO\VLV WKDW LV QRW RQO\ SULPLWLYH￿ EXW IXQGDPHQWDOO\ HUURQHRXV￿· Turnovsky (1995)
refers to it by writing: ”.LUPDQ VHHPV WR VXJJHVW WKDW ZH VKRXOG >abandon the representative agent model@·￿ and
hastens to add: ·DOWKRXJK WKDW YLHZ VHHPV H[WUHPH.”42
WR FRQVWUDLQWV” (Hahn and Solow, 1995), nor resorting to pure time series analysis is likely to
be the appropriate way out. Rather, to quote again Hahn and Solow, we should ”SD\ DWWHQWLRQ
WR PLFUR￿IRXQGDWLRQV LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW >RXU PDFUR PRGHOV@ DUH VXJJHVWHG E\ RU DQDORJRXV WR
RU ORRVHO\ DEVWUDFWHG IURP WKH PLFUR PRGHOV￿· As a consequence ·HFRQRPHWULFLDQV ZKR DUH
ZRUNLQJ LQ YLHZ RI VWXG\LQJ PDFURHFRQRPLF SROLF\ PXVW EH VDWLV¿HG ZLWK LPSXUH SURFHGXUHV￿
WKH\ DUH HYLGHQWO\ QRW MXVWL¿HG LQ GHIRUPLQJ WKH UHDOLW\ RI FRPSOH[ SKHQRPHQD LQ RUGHU WR IRUFH
LW WR ¿W LQWR RYHUO\ VLPSOL¿HG VSHFL¿FDWLRQV· (Malinvaud, 1981).Table 1
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